(1) A may make payment to a managing or or , but not to any other director, by way of compensation for loss of office, or as consideration for retirement from office or in connection with such loss or retirement.
(2) No payment shall be made under sub-section (1) in the following cases, namely:—
(a) where the director resigns from his office as a result of the reconstruction of the company, or of its amalgamation with any other or bodies corporate, and is appointed as the managing or whole-time director, manager or other of the reconstructed company or of the body corporate resulting from the amalgamation;
(b) where the director resigns from his office otherwise than on the reconstruction of the company or its amalgamation as aforesaid;
(c) where the office of the director is vacated under sub-section (1) of section 167;
(e) where the director has been guilty of fraud or breach of trust in relation to, or of gross negligence in or gross mismanagement of, the conduct of the affairs of the company or any or thereof; and
(f) where the director has instigated, or has taken part directly or indirectly in bringing about, the termination of his office.
(3) Any payment made to a managing or whole-time director or manager in pursuance of sub-section (1) shall not exceed the which he would have earned if he had been in office for the remainder of his term or for three years, whichever is shorter, calculated on the basis of the average remuneration actually earned by him during a period of three years immediately preceding the date on which he ceased to hold office, or where he held the office for a lesser period than three years, during such period:
Provided that no such payment shall be made to the director in the event of the commencement of the winding up of the company, whether before or at any time within twelve months after, the date on which he ceased to hold office, if the assets of the company on the winding up, after deducting the expenses thereof, are not sufficient to repay to the shareholders the capital, including the premiums, if any, contributed by them.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit the payment to a managing or whole-time director, or manager, of any remuneration for services rendered by him to the company in any other capacity.
(i) a co-operative society registered under any law relating to co-operative societies; and
(ii) any other body corporate (not being a company as defined in this Act), which the Central Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf
(i) controls the composition of the Board of Directors; or
(ii) exercises or controls more than one-half of the total voting power either at its own or together with one or more of its subsidiary companies:
Provided that such class or classes of holding companies as may be prescribed shall not have layers of subsidiaries beyond such numbers as may be prescribed.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause,—
(a) a company shall be deemed to be a subsidiary company of the holding company even if the control referred to in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) is of another subsidiary company of the holding company;
(b) the composition of a company’s Board of Directors shall be deemed to be controlled by another company if that other company by exercise of some power exercisable by it at its discretion can appoint or remove all or a majority of the directors;
(c) the expression “company” includes any body corporate;
(d) “layer” in relation to a holding company means its subsidiary or subsidiaries.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause, the expression “company” includes any body corporate;